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Titles to Real Property, Acquired Originally and by Transfer
inter vivos. By Ralph W. Aigler, University of Michigan
Law School. Volume 3 of Cases on the Law of Property.
American Casebook Series. Published by West Publishing
Co., St. Paul. 1916. Pp. xx, 953.
The point of departure in any criticism of a casebook on Prop-
erty must of course be a comparison with the monumental work
of the late John Chipman Gray. As Professor Aigler remarks,
"the collection of cases which bears his name has played no incon-
siderable part in exerting that influence" upon our property law
which all agree was Professor Gray's. The comparison is a
severe test for the follower in his footsteps; but upon making it
we come to a realization of the vast improvement in the materials
at hand to-day over those available when the Harvard professor
undertook his gigantic task.
In the first place, the modern professor has at hand as a model,
Gray's work, consisting of six volumes; the first edition appeared
between 1888-1892, and the second edition between 19o5-19o8. In
spite of the great amount of new American material that Aigler
has drawn upon, both statutory and common law, especially from
the middle west, we find a good many of the indispensable old
cases and classical passages in their familiar surroundings. Thus
in about thirty-five pages under Uses, where the resemblance is
perhaps a little greater than in other parts of the work, we have
besides the necessary parts of the Statutes of Uses and of Enroll-
ments and passages from Bacon, Gilbert, Sanders and Leake:
Shortridge v. Lamplugh, Armstrong v. Wolsey, Lutwich v.
Mitton, Roe v. Tranmer, Tyrrel's case, and Doe v. Passingham in.
the text; while in the footnote we recognize Same's case, Barker
v. Keete, Sharington v. Strotton, Callard v. Callard, Heelis v.
Blain, Witham v. Brooner, Egerton's case, a case from Keitwey
and Mildmay's case, all from Gray's text. This work, however,
is not a revision of the older work such as Professor Gray's suc-
cessors at Harvard have undertaken. It attempts to cover the
subject matter of Gray's Books, 3, 6, IO, 12, and 13. The other
eight books seem to be taken care of in other parts of the Ameri-
can Casebook Series. It is interesting to nolte the similarity
in the basis of the rearrangement of matter in this and other
modern casebooks. The historical order of the development of
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ideas is gradually being abandoned in favor of an arrangement
based on some outline of the whole subject as it is to-day. Com-
pare Thayer's Constitutional Law with Hall's, or Keener's Cases
in Equity with Boke's. Thus Gray takes us through the feudal
system, manors and tenure in general into estates through livery
of seisin and its various substitutes before and after the Statute
of Uses and stops short of present conditions. Aigler's general
outline of Original and Derivative Titles is analytical, and so are
the subdivisions, excepting within the chapter on Mode of Con-
veyances where historical periods are very sensibly retained as a
sort of echo of Gray.
This leads us to a consideration which justifies, but at the same
time causes us to regret, the attempt to supersede Gray, as Lang-
dell and others have been superseded, though not forgotten. Our
property law can be understood only in the light of history. Gray
had to create the historical background as he went along. To-day
we have studies at our elbow, which were somewhat foreign to
his vast learning even to the end. Though he quotes the great
History in his second edition, to him Maitland, the dean of legal
historians, was an antiquarian rather than a jurist (Nature and
Sources of the Law, 1909, p. 54). It is true that the year after
the publication of Gray's first volume we find Maitland, while
explaining why the history of English law had not been written,
still boasting of how much more material students of his day
have than was available when Mr. Reeve had set to work; but
his whole catalogue becomes insignificant in the light of his own
contributions which we now enjoy. When Gray was doing his
work, Bracton's Englishry was just being proved by Maitland
in his Introduction to the Notebook. He had not yet explained
the Beatitude of Seisin. The History which was to be produced
seven years later by co6peration with Pollock was not yet planned.
The outlook of the times, as represented for example in Digby,
was essentially Blackstonianism instructed by Kemble and Pal-
grave and spiced perhaps with a little questioning introduced by
Holmes. Vinogradoff had not yet opened up the study of village
life and the early manor to Englishmen, nor explained folkland
and bocland. The Selden Society in England and the great law
school journals in America were just beginning. Very few of
the Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History had been
written-very few could have been written. The modern pro-
fessor is relieved of the necessity of sketching his own historical
background, but he may be expected to make good use of all
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of this new material. Aigler's footnotes have a few references
to it. Maitland is permitted to explain the mystery of seisin
and his ideas of "possessoriness" very perceptibly influence the
compiler's point of view. But history could have been exploited
to explain a great deal more. The omission of the chapter on
Tenure---pardonable, no doubt, in a work called Titles-causes a
failure to place the whole subject in its historic setting. The
feudal framework of real property law is nowhere explained,
and the forces that gradually made of it a mere framework are
of course neglected. The tremendous influence exerted on real
property by the mediaval Englishman's inability to deal with
abstractions, the factor that made it seem proper even in the four-
teenth century to convey an advowson by delivering the handle of
the church door, is not called in to clear up difficulties. How pos-
session came to be nine points of the law we are not shown. And
lastly, the influence of adjective law on the substantive law of
later times is neglected. In short, the compiler's object is to
teach the law of property as it is, and not to explain it in the
light of legal development nor to reflect light on the sources
and nature of the law.
The compilation of Gray was, after all, material to illustrate
lectures of a very broad scope. The present book endeavors to
make a particular subject clear to the student as he goes along.
What Professor Aigler says is true: that the student cannot be
expected to gather any coherent ideas as to Uses before the
Statute, from the fragmentary extracts printed in Gray. Gray
would probably have admitted this charge and still have consid-
ered fragmentary extracts more useful in his particular work
than the admirable explanatory statement by Aigler (pp. 232-
236). But we must not forget the first words of Gray's preface:
"This collection of Cases is prepared for the convenience of stu-
dents in the Law School of Harvard University"--a sort of
warning that other schools must use the book at their peril.
Gray's personality is to go along with the book. Professor
Aigler, however, does not expect to accompany his book to the
hands of every user. He must sacrifice something for the sake
of clarity. Gray's volumes have been handy paraphernalia for
the teacher who sought to initiate the neophyte into the mystery
of the law. Aigler's book, though a better instrument for the
teaching of the rules of Property, is ill-adapted for this more




A Treatise on Federal Impeachments. By Alex. Simpson, Jr.,
LL.D., of the Philadelphia Bar. Published by The Law Asso-
ciation of Philadelphia. 1916. Pp. 23o.
In this modest work of 226 pages we have a careful account of
the development in the constitutional convention of 1787 of the
clauses in our national organic law touching impeachment, a
review of the principles governing impeachment trials, and,
in a valuable appendix, a catalogue of English and American
impeachment cases, together with suggestions as to rules of
procedure for the United States Senate when trying causes of
this nature. What is the true character of the Senate in
impeachment trials? That it is in a strictly judicial capacity,
and no other, that the Senate must act -when called upon to
consider an impeachment laid before it by the House of Represen-
tatives, cannot now be doubted; indeed the constitutional require-
ment of a fresh oath to be taken before proceeding to trial points,
at least, in such a direction, and, while the course of opinion
has not been uniform in the matter, no reasonable doubt can
now exist that the constitution-framers of 1787 intended to follow
British parliamentary traditions and confer upon the Upper
House of our national legislature all the powers of a High
Court of Impeachment, following the characterization of Black-
stone then already familiar to statesmen as well as students of
law. In the recent impeachment (and acquittal) of Judge
Swayne (19o5) the Senate, by a vote of 45 to 28, determined,
our author tells us, "that the respondent's voluntary statements,
made before a Committee of the House of Representatives, could
not be used against him on the trial of the impeachment because of
the Fifth Amendment and of section 859 of the Revised Statutes,
which provides: "No testimony given by a witness before either
House, or before a .Committee of either House of Congress,
shall be used in evidence in any criminal proceeding against him
in any court except in a prosecution for perjury in giving such
testimony."
Impeachment has been resorted to but nine times in our
national forum; the initial case, that of William Blount in 1797,
was dismissed on the ground that Senator Blount, accused of
promoting filibustering expeditions in the Floridas, was not a
civil officer within the constitutional clause relating to impeach-
ments. In the remaining eight instances, we find three con-
victions and five acquittals. Whether the constitutionally pro-
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vided method is, in fact, desirable or effective, may well be
thought to be among the unsettled problems of our governmental
plan. Mr. Simpson has given us, however, a valuable contribu-
tion to the subject and is to be congratulated. We commend the
volume to every student of American institutions.
GoRnON E. SHERMAN.
The Law of Interstate Commerce, and its Federal Regulation.
By Frederick N. Judson. Third Edition. Published by
Flood & Co., Chicago. 1916. Pp. v, io66.
Judson on Interstate Commerce, notwithstanding the numerous
books upon the same subject issued since the first edition, pub-
lished in 1905, has continued to be regarded as a first rate prac-
tical hand-book upon the Federal Act. The rapidity of the
growth of this law, both by statute and judicial exposition, amply
justifies three editions in eleven years. Since the second edition,
published in 1912, the number of cases involving the construction
of the various acts, as shown by the citations, has increased by
one half. Federal control of interstate commerce has been
greatly extended by the Cummings Amendment to the Carmack
Amendment, March 4, 1915; the Federal Anti-Trust Act, Oct.
15, 1915; the Federal Trade Commission Act, Sept. 26, 1914;
the Webb-Kenyon Act, March I, 1913; the Arbitration Act,
July 15, 1913. The power, so briefly stated in the constitution
"to regulate commerce * * * among the several states,"
has, directly or indirectly, brought substantially the entire com-
merce and industry of the country under federal control. The
several states, in the field not yet interpreted to be within reach
of the interstate commerce claim, are more and more applying
the theory of the interstate commerce act to intrastate control,
even to the extent of adopting whole clauses of the Federal Act.
Since the publication of this book in 1916, the eight hour act,
known as the Adamson Act, approved September 3 and 5, 1916,
has extended federal control over hours of labor and rates of
wages. The constitutionality of this act was established by the
U. S. Supreme Court. Recently also, the Supreme Court has
established the validity of the Webb-Kenyon act, above referred
to. The Child Labor Act, approved Sept. I, 1916, still further
extends the control of Congress in the line of economic regula-
tion. With the rapid development now going on in this field of
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law, text books rapidly become obselete, new matter must be
added, old matter must be rejected or rewritten. The present
third edition is most welcome, however soon a new edition may
be required.
E. B. GAGER.
A Treatise on the Law of Telegraph and Telephone Companies,
Including Electric Law. Second edition. By S. Walter Jones.
Published by Vernon Law Book Company, Kansas City, Mo.
1916. Pp. xxiv, 1O65.
In the first edition of Mr. Jones' work, published ten years
ago, no reference was made in the title to electric law, but
no change is made in the present edition in the plan and scope
of the work. In the first edition, as well as in the second, there
was some discussion of the question arising out of the construc-
tion, insulation, and maintenance of electric wires, the relative
duties and liabilities of companies using parallel or intersecting
wires carrying currents of different powers; and of injuries to
persons and property, caused by the electric current by electric
railway and electric light companies; but the main subject of the
work is the law governing the organization of telegraph and
telephone companies, and the construction and operation of their
lines, and the duties and liabilities of these companies. The scope
of the work is, therefore, more limited than that of Joseph C. and
Howard Joyce, under the title Electric Law published in 19oo.
The earlier work of Redfield on Telegraph Companies, Their
Rights and Ditties, 1869, was published before the telephone was
invented. Keasby on Electric Wires in Streets and High-
ways, published in 1892 and enlarged in I9OO, was in the nature
of a monograph on the law governing the use of the highways
for electric wires, and especially those of the newly invented
electric railways.
In the ten years that have passed since the publication of the
first edition of Mr. Jones' work there has been a great increase
in the number of the decisions in the courts of our own country
alone on every branch of the law affecting telegraph and tele-
phone companies, and Mr. Jones has diligently collected and
arranged them, using them as illustrations of the statements of
the text, or as showing the development of the law. Many new
paragraphs and some new chapters have been inserted, and some
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chapters have been rewritten. The copious notes of the new
edition have made the book a, digest brought down to date,
classified by states as well as by subjects in almost every topic
of the work. In the rapid accumulation of decided cases it is
important that the decisions should be classified by states, because
the development of the law must be studied first in the jurisdic-
tion in which it is applied, and then the cases elsewhere may be
used by way of illustration or correction, for otherwise the stu-
dent will be lost in a wilderness of special instances; but in a
work intended as a handbook of the practitioner in the law
applicable to a particular branch of business, it is desirable that
all the cases should be cited and that the rules generally estab-
lished should be stated with references to the authorities.
A suggestion was made in the first edition that some of the
accepted definitions of the telegraph might have to be modified
in view of the then recent experiments in wireless telegraphy,
and in the present edition the application of the law to this
mode of communication has been the subject of practical discus-
sion. Some reference is made in the work to the controversy
between the street railways and the telephone companies as to
which of the two must take measures to avoid the disastrous
effect on the telephone of the induction of the powerful current
of the street railway. There was in this controversy an interest-
ing question over the application of the doctrine of Fletcher v.
Rylands. The doctrine was invoked in England in National Tele-
phone Co. v. Baker [1893] 2 Ch. 186, and in a later case arising
in the Cape of Good Hope; but it was rejected by the United
States Circuit Court in Cumberland Telegraph Co. v. United
States Electric Co. (189o) 42 Fed. 273.
There is scant allusion in the present work to this interesting
question involving the basis of liability in tort. The purpose of
the book is rather to furnish a statement of the existing law gov-
erning the construction, organization, and operation of telegraph
and telephone companies, and their liability to persons dealing
with them or injured by them. There is some discussion of
franchises and taxation, but not much examination of the recent
controversy over franchises as the subject of taxation.
EDw. Q. KEASBY.
